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FLIGHT ATTENDANT WEIGHT REQUIREMENTS
AND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
CRAIG WEINLEIN
T HE AIRLINE companies expect all their customer-contact
employees consistently to present a favorable personal appear-
ance. This is especially true of flight attendants, since they spend
more time with customers than any other employee group. The
airlines thus take an active role in regulating flight attendant ap-
pearance.1 In so doing they usually prescribe that a flight attendant
I See, e.g., EASTERN Am LINES, FLIGHT ATTENDANT MANUAL: GROOMING
STANDARDS; UNIFORM REGULATIONS (1978); SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, HOSTESS
MANUAL (1977); TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., EMPLOYEE UNIFORM & APPEAR-
ANCE MANUAL; Braniff International Memo from the Director of Flight Attend-
ant Services to All Flight Attendants (July 18, 1975).
Eastern Air Lines' grooming regulations for women's hair are typical of the
industry practice:
Hair:
-An attractive business-like hair style in keeping with current
trend.
-Hair must be clean, in good condition, and the style well main-
tained at all times.
-Keep hair trimmed and/or curled as frequently as the style
demands.
-Hair may not fall forward or across the face when serving.
-Natural blow dried hairdos that have a tendency to bounce,
fall or become messy looking with weather or cabin activity
must be lightly sprayed to keep in place.
-Longer hair styles are permitted provided the hair is no longer
than six inches below the shoulder and is kept curled and styled.
-Long straight hair must be pulled back.
-Hair longer than six inches below the shoulder must be worn
up.
-All hair styles are subject to supervisory approval.
Hair Pieces: Must match hair color and be approved by your super-
visor.
Wigs: To be natural looking and approved by your supervisor.
Hair Accessories:
-Plain tortoise and yellow gold hair accessories may be worn for
hair maintenance and are subject to supervisory approval.
-Three-quarter inch blue or yellow grosgrain ribbon to match
blouses or the blouse tie belt may be used to tie back/control
long hair. When ribbon/tie belt are worn, they may not hang
more than 5" from the knot.
-Uniform scarves and neck fillers may be worn as a hair band to
secure long hair as long as they are folded so as not to exceed
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may not exceed a certain weight' which corresponds to his or her
height and his or her sex.' This comment examines whether those
weight requirements, which impose different limitations for males
than for females of the same height, unlawfully discriminate against
women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.,
I. THE HISTORY OF TITLE VII
Legislative history indicates that the primary purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to insure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating racially discriminatory practices.! The
two inches in width. They may also be worn to secure a G.W.
-Scarves/neck fillers tied about the head that give an Indian
headband or peasant look whereby most of the head is covered
are not permitted.
-No other hair accessories are permitted.
Hair Coloring:
When other than natural is subject to supervisory approval. General
guidelines are:
-Well maintained (no roots).
-Color becoming to complexion.
-Extremes to the light or dark that cause an artificial look are
unacceptable.
-Colored hair must meet all other hair regulations.
EASTERN AIRLINES, FLIGHT ATTENDANT MANUAL: GROOMING STANDARDS; UNI-
FORM REGULATIONS 53-54 (1978).
2 See, e.g., SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, HOSTESS MANUAL (1977); TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC., EMPLOYEE UNIFORM & APPEARANCE MANUAL; Eastern Air Lines
Letter from the Vice President of In-Flight Services to All Flight Attendants
(July 14, 1978); Braniff International Memo from the Director of Flight At-
tendant Services to All Flight Attendants (July 18, 1975).
For Southwest to achieve a superior appearance goal, we have
found it necessary to establish and maintain rigid weight controls.
It is mandatory that you comply with these regulations, or you can
expect disciplinary action up to and including dismissal. Weights
will be checked at the discretion of the Flight Attendant Office.
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, HOSTESS MANUAL 3 (1977).
'SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, HOSTESS MANUAL 3 (1977); TRANS WORLD AIRLINES,
INC., EMPLOYEE UNIFORM & APPEARANCE MANUAL; Eastern Air Lines Letter from
the Vice President of In-Flight Services to All Flight Attendants (July 14, 1978);
Braniff International, Weight Chart For Female Flight Attendants; Braniff Inter-
national, Weight Chart For Male Flight Attendants.
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
5S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2355; H.R. RP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
"The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
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amendment adding "sex" to Title VII was something of an after-
thought," offered as a floor amendment without any prior legisla-
tive hearing or debate one day before the House of Representatives
approved Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." As a result, there is
no historical reference to the intended scope of the "sex" amend-
ment to Title VII which emerged from the limited floor discussion.!
of white employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
SThe "sex amendment" was introduced by Representative Howard Smith of
Virginia, who had opposed the Civil Rights Act, and was accused by some of
wishing to sabotage its passage by his proposal. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]; Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965, 968
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Employer Dress Codes].
Representative Smith said in introducing his amendment:
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is offered to the fair employment
practices title of this bill to include within our desire to prevent
discrimination against another minority group, the women, but a
very essential minority group, in the absence of which the majority
group would not be here today.
I want to read you an extract from a letter that I received the
other day.
"The census of 1960 shows that we had 88,331,000 males living
in this country, and 90,992,000 females, which leaves this country
with an 'imbalance' of 2,661,000 females.
"Just why the Creator would set up such an 'imbalance' of
spinsters, shutting off the 'right' of every female to have a husband
of her own, is, of course, known only to nature.
"But I am sure you will agree that this is a grave injustice to
womankind and something that Congress and President Johnson
should take immediate steps to correct, especially in this election
year.
"Up until now, instead of assisting these poor unfortunate females
in obtaining their 'right' to happiness, the Government has on sev-
eral occasions engaged in wars which killed off a large number of
eligible males, creating an 'imbalance' in our male and female
population that was even worse than before."
I read this letter just to illustrate that women have some real
grievances and some real rights to be protected, I am serious about
this thing.
110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). See also 110 CONG. REC.
2581-82 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Green).
7 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2581, 2804-05, 14511, 15897 (1964). See Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Developments, supra note 6; Employer
Dress Codes, supra note 6.
' 110 CONG. Rac. 2577, 2581, 2804-05, 14511, 15897 (1964). See Barnes v.
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In light of this insufficient and inconclusive legislative history be-
hind the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII, it has been held that
Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription of
sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping implica-
tions.' The alternative view has been that although the last minute
inclusion of "sex" has obscured the congressional intent, the
amendment did survive intact, and from that fact it should be
presumed that Congress intended to carry out its underlying policy,
notwithstanding the political or tactical maneuvers which moti-
vated the proponents of the amendment." Other attempts to modify
Title VII by including age as' an impermissible employment cri-
terion" or weakening the sex amendment by proscribing only dis-
crimination based "solely" on sex failed,' and such failure lends
credence to the latter view.1'
When the 1964 Civil Rights Act was amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972'" there was considerable
discussion on the topic of sex discrimination.' It then became
evident that Congress was deeply concerned about gender-based
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Developments, supra note 6; Employer
Dress Codes, supra note 6. See also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co.,
507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
°Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir.
1975).
"0Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 312
(1968); Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 884-86 (1967); Employer Dress Codes, supra note 6.
"See 110 CONG. REc. 2596-99 (1964).
2Id. at 2728.
13 See Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKm L.J. 671, 677-78.
14 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
" The Report of the House of Representatives General Subcommittee on
Labor stated:
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their
self-fulfillment and development is frustrated because of their
sex....
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable
in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex dis-
crimination since its enactment in 1964....
[D]iscrimination against women continues to be widespread, and
is regarded by many as either morally or physiologically justi-
fiable.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2140-41.
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employment discrimination and intended to combat it as vigorously
as any other type of forbidden discrimination."
II. THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION EXCEPTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ' (Title VII) prohibits
sex discrimination 8 in any industry affecting commerce. 9 The
statute, however, makes an exception for what otherwise would be
discriminatory in those instances where sex is "a bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of... [the] business....
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception
has been narrowly construed,"' and the employer has the burden
16 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CoDE
CoNrG. & AD. NEws 2137.
1742 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
Is42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
1942 U.S.C. 5§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a) (1976).
w042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify,
or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization
to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment
any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual
in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise....
21 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th
Cir. 1974); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See also 29 C.F.R. 5 1604.2 (1978).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stressed that the word "necessary"
in the BFOQ exception means a business necessity, not business convenience, is
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of proving its existence." Sex cannot be a BFOQ where either sex
may perform any of the functions of a position. Sex can only be
a BFOQ when an unbiased reasonable person would perceive the
service offered by two employees as essentially different if the
employees' sexes were different.' The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) has determined this precludes sex
as a BFOQ for the position of airline flight attendant.'
Airline-imposed weight regulations which are different for male
and female flight attendants do not appear justified under the
BFOQ exception, since there is no valid occupational reason why
women must weigh less than their male counterparts. While it may
be true that passengers would prefer to see female flight attendants
slimmer than males of the same height, the EEOC has generally
determined that mere customer preference will not warrant the
application of the BFOQ exception." A generally held, but stereo-
typed, assumption that women weigh less than men will not invoke
the BFOQ exception."6
Safety and efficiency arguably might demand that female flight
attendants weigh less than male flight attendants. The bulk of the
flight attendant's training and responsibility is devoted to safety,"
which requires that females be slim and in excellent physical con-
required. Only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined
by the inclusion of both sexes can discrimination based on sex be valid. Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971). See also Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040
(4th Cir. 1976).
"Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
'Developments, supra note 6, at 1181.
2433 Fed. Reg. 3361 (1968). See Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006
(5th Cir. 1972); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
-29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1978). The EEOC's guidelines are entitled
to considerable weight in construing the BFOQ exception. Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). But see General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
"Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)
(1978). See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
27 14 C.F.R. § 121.421 (1979); see also 14 C.F.R. § 121.427 (1979) (recur-
rent training).
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dition." In Dothard v. Rawlinson," however, the Supreme Court
held that a correlation between weight and physical condition is
too weak to justify application of the BFOQ exception.' There
the Alabama Department of Public Safety sought to justify height
and weight requirements by claiming they were related to a neces-
sary job qualification, namely strength.' The Court viewed the
employer's invocation of the BFOQ exception strictly and held
that if the strength requirement is bona fide, the purpose can be
achieved by adopting and validating a test for applicants that
measures strength directly.' Such a test, fairly administered, would
fully satisfy the standards of Title VII because it would be one that
measures the person for the job and "not the person in the ab-
stract. ' From Dothard it is clear that since the disparate weight
requirements for flight attendants cannot be sustained by the
BFOQ exception, they are in violation of Title VII if it can be
shown they discriminate on the basis of sex.
III. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT CONSTITUTING DISCRIMINATION
Even though the statute protects men and women equally, ' de-
termining when an employment practice discriminates on the basis
of sex is not always clear.' Generally, sufficient proof of a Title
28 There is approximately one flight attendant for every 50 passenger seats.
14 C.F.R. § 121.391 (1979). As a team they must be able to evacuate all
passengers in 90 seconds. Id. at S 25.803(c). It is arguable that a flight attend-
ant who is slim and physically fit is more capable of performing these duties
than a flight attendant who is not.
29 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
30 Id.
31Id. at 331.
"Id. at 332. Evidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of, or significantly correlated with, im-
portant elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job
or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated. EEOC Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978). See also Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975);
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
1 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
- Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
'As an example, employment discrimination based upon transsexuality was
held outside the protection of Title VII. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). Discrimination based upon homosexuality is not
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VII violation is found when an employment practice is shown to
have a substantially disproportionate effect upon a statutorily pro-
tected classification.' In such a case a discriminatory purpose need
not be proved."
One way to demonstrate a disproportionate impact is through
the use of statistics. 8 In Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, lnc.,' for ex-
ample, the employer had a minimum height requirement of five
feet seven inches for pilots. This requirement, according to sta-
tistics presented by the plaintiff-pilot and accepted as fact by the
trial court,' excluded 93% of the American females between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-four,"' yet it excluded only 25.8% of
the American males of the same age." Such a disproportionate
impact made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII.'
Flight attendants have challenged airline weight requirements
on the ground that they also have a disproportionate impact upon
the sexes." The courts, however, have not agreed. ' In Jarrell v.
covered. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975),
aff'd, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
36Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); Robinson v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.
1975); Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
"7 "Title VII is not concerned with the employer's 'good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent' for 'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the con-
sequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.'" Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). See, e.g., Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251,
1259 (5th Cir. 1975).
18 Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975); Robinson
v. City of Dallas, 514 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975); Leonard v. National Airlines,
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
"11568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
1419 F. Supp. 1061, 1063-64 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
41 568 F.2d at 52 n.1.
4Id.
SId. at 52. The airline subsequently successfully maintained a minimum
height requirement of five feet five inches as a bona fide occupational qualification.
Id. at 54.
" Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962
(S.D. Fla. 1976), afl'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977); Gerdom v. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6051 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
1 Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577
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Eastern Air Lines, Inc.' the airline maintained weight maximums
based on height that were different for male and female flight
attendants." According to the court's findings of fact, when the
employer's requirements were applied to the general population
of the United States between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-one
a smaller percentage of American women than American men
were able to comply.' Only 33.3% of the women in the United
States could meet Eastern's weight requirements for females, while
43.5% of America's men could meet the male requirements. The
court held that these statistical differences were not sufficient to
establish a discriminatory impact upon women. " In Leonard v.
National Airlines, Inc.,"1 a similar result was reached. National
Airlines' weight limitations for men were attainable by 30% of
the male population, while its female standards could only be
attained by 22% of America's women. 1 The court held this in-
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962
(S.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977); Gerdom v. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6051 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
4430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977).
47 Eastern Air Lines had a formalized weight program enforced by the
flight attendant's supervisor. 430 F. Supp. at 887-88. Weights were checked on
a standard medical scale without shoes but with clothes according to the fol-
lowing table:
HEIGHT-MAXIMUM WEIGHT CHART FOR FLIGHT ATTENDANTS:
(effective Nov. 1973)
Height Maximum Weight Maximum Weight






67" 135 lbs. 156 lbs.
68" 140 lbs. 161 lbs.
69" 145 lbs. 166 lbs.
70" - 171 lbs.




430 F. Supp. at 888-89.
4 430 F. Supp. at 889-90.
49 Id. at 892. See Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976).
50 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
51 Id. at 275.
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sufficient to prove a discriminatory impact"
The courts have been reluctant to hold that flight attendant
weight limitations unlawfully discriminate against females because
they are more difficult for women to meet than for men. This re-
luctance might be due in part to the fact the flight attendant posi-
tions remain an overwhelmingly female-dominated field.'
The weight requirements presently imposed by the majority of
American air carriers have no greater statistical impact upon the
United States population than those found to be non-discriminatory
in Leonard and Jarrell. Taking a representative height of five feet
seven inches the following chart shows the corresponding maxi-
mum weight presently required by various airlines:"'
AIRLINE FEMALE MALE
Braniff 136 lbs. 155 lbs.
Eastern 135 lbs. 156 lbs.
TWA 137 lbs. 161 lbs.
Southwest 130 lbs. 160 lbs.
These industry requirements may be compared with United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) statistics
of the average weights of Americans by age and height:'
52 Id.
5 See Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 887 (E.D. Va. 1977).
5' The following shows a more complete analysis for a wide range of heights:
MAXIMUM WEIGHT IN POUNDS
HEIGHT BRANIFF EASTERN TWA SOUTHWEST
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
5' 2" 115 130 115 - 117 136 105 135
5' 3" 119 135 119 - 121 141 110 140
5' 4" 124 140 123 - 125 146 115 145
5' 5" 128 145 127 - 129 151 120 150
5' 6" 132 150 131 - 133 156 125 155
5' 7" 136 155 135 156 137 161 130 160
5' 8" 140 160 140 161 141 167 135 165
5' 9" 145 165 145 166 145 170 140 170
5' 10" 150 170 - 171 149 174 - -
5' 11" - 180 - 176 - 179 - -
6' 0" - 190 - 181 - 184 - -
6' 1" - 200 - 186 - 189 - -
6' 2" - 210 - 191 - 194 - -
See note 3 supra.
I Although linear regression of weight on height was used, the relationship
between weight and height is not strictly linear. The constants-regression co-





WEIGHTS AND SELECTED PERCENTILES
BY HEIGHT
WOMEN
(Age Group In Years)
18-24 25-34
190 lbs. 206 lbs.
180 lbs. 194 lbs.
168 lbs. 180 lbs.
144 lbs. 153 lbs.
120 lbs. 126 lbs.
108 lbs. 112 lbs.
98 lbs. 100 lbs.
MEN
(Age Group In Years)
18-24 25-34
199 lbs. 215 lbs.
189 lbs. 204 lbs.
177 lbs. 191 lbs.
154 lbs. 165 lbs.
131 lbs. 139 lbs.
119 lbs. 126 lbs.
109 lbs. 115 lbs.
(Source: HEW, ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS No. 14,
WEIGHT By HEIGHT AND AGE OF ADULTS 18-74 YEARS (1977)).
Figures in italics are the expected means. Those weights above and
below the expected mean weight represent the standard error"
of the estimate covering the range of 60%, 80%, and 90% of the
population around the mean, respectively. The first range is ex-
pected thus to identify 20%, 10% and 5% of the population
of the specific height on either side of the range."' Using wom-
en ages 18-24 as an example: the average weight is 144 pounds;
60% of the population weighs between 168 and 120 pounds;
standard error of estimate around these regression lines for twelve age-sex groups
are shown below:























18-24 years .259 -56.28 2.965 28.0
25-34 years .263 -88.62 3.587 32.1
35-44 years .270 -94.02 3.815 35.0
45-54 years .246 -77.17 3.587 33.8
55-64 years .249 -68.24 3.492 33.4
65-74 years .285 -76.38 3.583 29.0
HEW, ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS No. 14, WEIGHT BY
HEIGHT AND AGE OF ADULTS 18-74 YEARS at 1 and 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as HEW STATISTICS].
56 Since the relationship between height and weight is not strictly linear, the
standard error of estimate is the measure which indicates the spread of the given
points of a sampling around the line of regression.
57 HEW STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 7.
1980]
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80% of the population weighs between 180 and 108 pounds; and
90% of the population weighs between 190 and 98 pounds.
For females in both age groups, the airlines' maximum standards
are lower than the national mean, thereby excluding over 50%
of the nation's women. But they are higher than the next weight
value, thereby excluding less than 80% of the female population.
For men in the 18-24 age group, the industry maximums are just
somewhat higher than the national mean, thereby excluding less
than 50% of the American men. For men in the 25-34 age group,
the industry maximums are slightly less than the national mean,
thereby excluding just over 50% of the nation's males. The pres-
ent airline standards on weight for the height of five feet seven
inches thus exclude approximately 50% of the nation's men from
employment consideration. They exclude approximately 62% of
the country's women. These percentages remain relatively the
same throughout all heights." The ratio of females to males pres-
ently excluded is close to the ratios found non-discriminatory in
Leonard and Jarrell. Thus, the present weight requirements im-
posed by the airline industry do not have a sufficiently dispropor-
tionate impact to prove a Title VII violation in the absence of
proof of a discriminatory purpose.
IV. ANY DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT CONSTITUTING
DISCRIMINATION
Many cases, however, have not relied upon the disproportionate
impact approach to find that the weight requirements violate Title
VII. Instead they have held that any difference in treatment be-
tween males and females is per se discriminatory." These courts
have drawn analogies to grooming codes which are merely cos-
metic in nature to decide the issue of flight attendant weight re-
quirements."o
A survey of early decisions reveals that the lower courts were
"The complete weight charts in note 54 supra may be compared with the
full HEW chart. See HEW STATISTICS, supra note 55.
"See Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Jarrell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), afl'd, 577 F.2d 869
(4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962 (S.D.
Fla. 1976), afl'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
60See note 59 supra.
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in conflict on cases in which employee grooming codes were
alleged to be sexually discriminatory. Most of these decisions were
with regard to grooming codes which required males to conform
to certain appearance standards, but which did not require similar
compliance on the part of female employees.
Some courts, holding that such grooming codes do not discrimi-
nate, found that rules which differ between the sexes with regard
to minor details of appearance do not discriminate within the
meaning of Title VII.6 In Baker v. California Land Title Co.,6 2
for instance, the court found that a grooming code requiring shorter
hair for male employees does not constitute discrimination within
the meaning of Title VII. The court defined discrimination as "a
failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction




The court went on to say, "custom and tradition have always
recognized and accepted differing styles of dress and grooming
based upon sex." The distinction was held to be reasonable." Such
rules have also been found to be reasonable if developed in con-
junction with management and labor, and if applied for the purpose
of insuring a neat attractive work force." The Baker court further
held that a private employer may make reasonable rules respect-
"
tSee, e.g., Dripps v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D.
Pa. 1974), a/f'd mem., 515 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1975) (an employment policy
forbidding beards did not constitute sex discrimination when based upon a
reasonable concern for safety); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
402 (D.D.C. 1972) (a grooming code requiring shorter hair for men is not
sexually discriminatory where it is not an artificial or arbitrary standard);
Stradley v. Anderson, 349 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Neb. 1972), a/f'd, 478 F.2d 188
(8th Cir. 1973) (regulations governing the length and style of hair and mustaches
for male police officers are not discriminatory where the purpose is to achieve
the legitimate state interest of presenting a police force with a "neutral appear-
ance"); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972),
a/f'd, 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975) (a
grooming code requiring shorter hair for male employees is not discriminatory);
Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6590 (D.D.C. 1971), af/'d, 488
F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (employer grooming rules which are different for
males and females do not discriminate sexually where they are developed in
conjunction with both management and labor, and are applied for the purpose
of insuring a neat and attractive appearance).
62 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972), af'd, 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
63 349 F. Supp. at 238.
" Id.
"Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6590 (D.D.C. 1971), a/f'd,
488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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ing the grooming of his employees as a condition of employment,
and the fact that the rules differ in minor detail between the sexes
is not unlawful sex discrimination."
One court held that grooming standards are outside the in-
tended application of Title VIl7 because they do not represent
any attempt by the employer to prevent the employment of a par-
ticular sex, nor do they pose a distinct employment disadvantage
for one sex." Continuing this line of reasoning, one could char-
acterize the grooming regulation stereotype as involving political
or ideological overtones rather than sexual ones. Not being a job-
related stereotype it is therefore beyond the reach of Title VII."
These arguments advance the view that Title VII does not prevent
an employer from making reasonable dress and grooming regula-
tions for his employees, even though they result in a difference in
treatment between men and women.
Other courts, however, have held that grooming codes which
have different standards for the sexes represent an unlawful dis-
crimination in violation of Title VI. 0 In Rafjord v. Randle East-
ern Ambulance Service, Inc.,"1 for example, discharging a man
because of his failure to cut his hair was held to discriminate against
him to the extent that females with equally long hair were allowed
to work. The court in Rafford held that the Title VII test of sex
discrimination is any dissimilar treatment of similarly situated
men and women based on sex."" Such dissimilar treatment exists
whenever there is a classification of employees on the basis of
their sex."3 This broad approach has been the position of the
6Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972),
afl'd, 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
67 Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68 Id. at 1337.
'9 Employer Dress Codes, supra note 6, at 977.
7OSee, e.g., Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal.
1972); Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D.
Fla. 1972); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal.
1972); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See
generally Employer Dress Codes, supra note 6.
71348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
Id. at 319. See generally Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp.
661 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
'Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (an
illegal classification exists when the employer has a rule that all men must wear
496
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which in
several decisions involving employer grooming regulations which
limit the length of male employees' hair without placing similar
restrictions on female employees, has held that such employment
practices violated Title VII.
This was the contradictory state of the law until the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Co.' influenced the lower courts. In Willingham an applicant was
denied employment as a copy layout artist on the defendant's
daily newspaper because of his shoulder-length hair."' The em-
ployer's grooming code required all employees who came into
contact with the public to be neatly dressed and groomed in
accordance with community business standards.' Such local
standards were interpreted by the newspaper's management to
exclude the employing of long-haired men, but not long-haired
hats while women may wear hairnets, and men are refused permission to wear
a hairnet).
74 EEOC Decision No. 72-2179, [1972] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 5 6,395
(an employment policy placing no restrictions on the hair length of female em-
ployees, but which prohibited similarly situated males from wearing their hair
below the back of their collars violated Title VII); EEOC Decision No. 72-1931,
[1968-1973 EEOC Decisions] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 5 6,373 (the refusal
to hire long-haired male applicants when long-haired females were hired consti-
tuted discrimination in the absence of a showing of business necessity); EEOC
Decision No. 72-1380, [1968-1973 EEOC Decisions] 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH)
5 6,364 (a different hair length policy for male and female employees constituted
sex discrimination); EEOC Decision No. 72-0979, [1968-1973 EEOC Decisions]
2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 5 6,343 (a hair length policy which allowed females
to wear their hair longer than males discriminated against males as a class and
violated Title VII); EEOC Decision No. 71-2343, [1968-1973 EEOC Decisions]
2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6,256 (a hair length policy that only applied
to male cargo handlers violated Title VII); EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, [1968-
1973 EEOC Decisions] 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 5 6,231 (Title VII is
violated by any refusal to hire long-haired male production workers where
long-haired females are employed).
Dissimilar treatment based on sex need not be in conjunction with groom-
ing standards but may also be extended to other aspects of personal behavior.
In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971), an employer's rule that female flight attendants could not marry,
when there was no similar rule for males, was per se discriminatory. Similarly,
in Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974), a male applicant
was hired for a vacant position over a female employee on the assumption he
was better able to do the job, and no objective test was given by the employer
to determine the physical abilities of either applicant. The employer had to
prove he was not engaged in unlawful sex discrimination. Id.
- 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
7 Id. at 1087.
"
7 Id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
women.78 The applicant brought suit alleging that the employer's
grooming code unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex in viola-
tion of Title VII."9 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en
banc decided that it did not."
In its attempt to determine whether Congress intended sex dis-
crimination to include grooming standards, the Fifth Circuit found
Title VII's legislative history to be inconclusive at best.8' The court
concluded by way of negative inference that "Congress . . . did
not intend its proscription of sexual discrimination to have signifi-
cant or sweeping implications."8 Congress only intended that the
sexes have equal employment opportunities," which are secured,
according to the court, when employers are prohibited from dis-
tinguishing between men and women on the basis of "immutable
characteristics" or "fundamental right[s]."" Hair length is neither
immutable nor constitutionally protected,' and the employee can
comply with the regulation by subordinating his appearance prefer-
ences to his desire for employment. Such grooming codes are
therefore more closely related to the employer's choice of how to
run his business than to equality of employment opportunity."
78 Id.
7
' Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Ga.
1972).
10 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 1090.
82 Id.
1aId. at 1091.
"Id. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971). In Phillips an employer refused to hire women with pre-
school age children, but had no such policy regarding males with pre-school age
children. The Supreme Court in a short per curiam decision held that an em-
ployer could not have one hiring policy for men and another for women if the
legislative purpose of giving people of like qualifications equal employment op-
portunity regardlcss of sex was to be effected. 400 U.S. at 542. In Sprogis the
Seventh Circuit struck down as sexually discriminatory an airline rule that female
flight attendants were not allowed to marry, while male flight attendants and
other employees were so allowed. The court in Willingham distinguished the
the instant case by noting that the rights to marry and have children were funda-
mental and constitutionally protected. Further, the hiring condition in Phillips
was based on having pre-school age children, an existing condition not subject
to change. 507 F.2d at 1091. The court did not believe its decision was incon-
sistent with these opinions. Id.
81507 F.2d at 1091.
8 Id.
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Decisions following Willingham involving grooming codes which
are dissimilar in treatment for males and females have consistently
held that such regulations do not discriminate on the basis of sex."'
Instead, such regulations are deemed to discriminate on the basis
of grooming standards.88 Citing Willingham, they conclude that
mere difference in treatment is not unlawful sex discrimination
when such difference is not based upon a fundamental right or
immutable characteristic.8 A Title VII violation can only be found
if the grooming code was established as a pretext to exclude one
sex from employment," is enforced in an uneven manner against
one sex, 1 or actually affects the employment opportunity of one
sex."
Courts faced with the issue of whether flight attendant weight
requirements violate Title VII have looked to the line of grooming
code cases. In Lafey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.," decided prior
to Willingham, the court found that the weight requirements for
female flight attendants were in violation of Title VII." In this case,
however, the employer imposed no weight requirements at all upon
its male pursers." The weight program was found to be merely
" See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977);
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v.
Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v.
Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Knott v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F.
Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Thomas v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Jahns v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 391 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1975); McConnell v. Mercantile Nat'l
Bank at Dallas, 389 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
"Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Tex.
1975); McConnell v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas, 389 F. Supp. 594 (N.D.
Tex. 1975).
89 See note 87 supra.
90Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir.
1976); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975).
9 Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (a
grooming and dress code for both sexes, but with hair length restrictions applic-
able only to males, is not discriminatory).
92 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
According to Willingham a grooming code not based upon immutable character-
istics cannot affect employment opportunities. No one is deprived of any employ-
ment position. Affected persons must simply order their priorities between per-
sonal appearance and the employment opportunity. Id. at 1091.
93 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973).
"Id. at 790.
95 Id. at 773-74. This case is thus distinguishable from the other cases in this
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one aspect of the broader spectrum of unequal treatment practiced
by the employer." Females had lower salaries and pensions, were
provided less expensive layover accommodations, and did not re-
ceive the uniform cleaning allowance that was provided for males."'
Having found that the employer's weight control program violated
Title VII, the court subsequently enjoined the airline from impos-
ing it upon its female employees." The court enjoined the airline's
suspension or termination of employment for weight reasons, un-
less the excessive weight was such as to render the flight attendant
physically incapable of performing her duties."
Cases arising after Willingham have consistently held that air-
line weight control programs that impose different standards for
males and females do not violate Title VII simply because of dif-
ference in treatment.1 ' These holdings have followed the Willing-
ham approach that mere difference in treatment between the
sexes is not illegal discrimination unless founded upon an "immut-
able characteristic" or a "fundamental right.''.
comment in which the employer imposes some weight requirements for males,




" Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974),
afl'd, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). On
appeal the airline conceded that its practices constituted discriminatory condi-
tions of employment, but sought to defend its conduct as inadvertent and un-
intentional. 567 F.2d at 454. The District of Columbia Circuit held that Title
VII prohibits any discriminatory practice that was not merely accidental. Id. at
454-55. A general intent to do the discriminatory act is sufficient. Id.
"374 F. Supp. at 1387. The court also ordered affected past employees re-
instated with back pay and system seniority intact. Id.
"'Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Jarrell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), afl'd, 577 F.2d 869
(4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962 (S.D.
Fla. 1976), afl'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
11 Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Jarrell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), afl'd, 577 F.2d 869
(4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962 (S.D.
Fla. 1976), a0f'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977). "Fundamental rights" are
those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court will
require a showing of compelling state interest if it is not to invalidate legislation
which impairs a "fundamental right." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528
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In Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,0" a female flight attendant main-
tained she was unable to reduce her weight to the employer's allow-
able maximum because of inherent female characteristics,"° and
therefore the weight requirements discriminated on the basis of sex
(1965). The Court has viewed the Constitution as guaranteeing these "fundamental
rights": the right to privacy, see generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 301 U.S.
479 (1965); the right to vote, see generally Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right to travel, see generally Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to pro-
create, see generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the right to
marriage, see generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and the right of access to the criminal justice system,
see generally Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). The Court has refused to label as "fundamental," rights involv-
ing: housing, see generally Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); welfare,
see generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); education, see gen-
erally San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
or economic regulation, see generally New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
A classification that results in different treatment for various groups of people
does not necessarily violate the equal protection clause. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). Unless the classification is suspect, the Supreme
Court requires only that the classification be reasonable, and rationally related
to a valid legislative purpose. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
172 (1972); McDonald v. Board of Elections Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809
(1962). See Developments, supra note 6, at 1082. This rational relationship
test is historically applied to classifications resulting from regulation in the
areas of social welfare or economics. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970) (state aid for families with dependent children). When the classificatory
scheme is suspect, the Court will view such legislation with "strict scrutiny."
See J. NowAX, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
522 (1978); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Developments, supra note 6. This standard of
review was first employed to eliminate classification based on race. Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964). The Supreme Court has considered the following classifications
suspect: race, see generally Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and alienage, see generally In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
While classifications based on sex have not been held to be suspect, the Supreme
Court has stated they must have a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
11 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962 (S.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 99
(5th Cir. 1977).
10 1 The plaintiff asserted her need to take birth control pills and the fact
that females have a singular physiological constitution. 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. at
4962.
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in violation of Title VII.'" For the purpose of ruling upon a motion
for summary judgment the court accepted her arguments as true."
Analogizing these weight restrictions to hair length restrictions"M
the court held, on the authority of Willingham, that Title VII does
not protect classifications which result from grooming standards. '
In Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,' °5 flight attendants unsuccess-
fully attempted to show that the airline's weight control program was
disproportionate in its impact on the sexes." They also argued that
the weight regulations were invalid because any difference in
treatment of the sexes is per se discriminatory."' Relying upon the
hair length cases the court held that weight, like hair, is a char-
acteristic subject to the reasonable control of most individuals.'
The court did not cite Willingham, but instead relied upon an
appellate decision from its own circuit which held that sex differ-
entiated grooming standards do not constitute discrimination under
Title VII.1"' The court also noted that there was unanimity among
the circuit courts that an employer may impose reasonable groom-
ing standards upon its employees which need not be identical for
males and females.'
In Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc.,' the court upheld the de-
fendant's weight policy on the authority of Willingham, Jarrell, and
Cox."' Title VII is not intended to interfere with an employer's
right to determine how best to run his business."" It only prohibits
artificial and arbitrary barriers to employment that operate on the
basis of an impermissible classification." Analyzing the classifica-
104 Id.
105 Id.
0 Id. at 4963.
107 id.
105430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), afl'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
10
' See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
110 430 F. Supp. at 891.
1Id. at 892.
I id. at 891. See Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d
1349 (4th Cir. 1976).
11430 F. Supp. at 891. See note 87 supra.
14434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
131d. at 275.
l1d Id.; Wilingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th
Cir. 1975).
117 434 F. Supp. at 275. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971).
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tion as one based upon weight, not sex, the court held that weight
is not an impermissible classification because it is not "immut-
able.",
Finally in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., " both the airline's weight standards for males and
females and its maternity leave policy were challenged under Title
VII."* The court dismissed the challenge to the defendant's weight
program in a cursory paragraph. On the basis of Cox and Willing-
ham, they found that "under no set of facts can plaintiff recover
on the legal theory she urges. This is so because weight is neither
an immutable characteristic nor a constitutionally protected cate-
gory."M
21
It would appear that the law in this area is settled. Flight attend-
ant weight requirements which impose different weight maximums
upon males and females do not discriminate on the basis of sex
merely because of difference in treatment. Faithfulness to the
Willingham approach should be tempered, however, by the recent
Supreme Court decision in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart."'
V. POSSIBLE EFFECT OF MANHART
In Manhart the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
required its female employees to make larger contributions to its
pension fund than its male employees."* The larger contribution
was required because on the average women live longer than men.'"
The Supreme Court noted the parties accepted this statistical dif-
ference as unquestionably truel" but nevertheless held such dis-
parate treatment to be in violation of Title VII.
11 434 F. Supp. at 275. See Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp.
884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Cox v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4962 (S.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d
99 (5th Cir. 1977).
19441 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
20 Id. at 627.
121 Id.
122435 U.S. 702 (1978).
123 435 U.S. at 704.
"'i Id. at 705. The employer's assertion that on the average women live longer
than men was based on a study of mortality tables and the employer's own
experience. Id.
m Id. at 707.
12 Id. at 711.
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In commenting upon the effect of Title VII upon employment
discrimination, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Man-
hart, noted that before its enactment an employer could base his
policies on assumptions about the differences between men and
women, regardless of whether such assumptions were valid.""7 The
Justice stated that it is now well recognized that Title VII pre-
cludes employment decisions based upon mere stereotyped im-
pressions about the characteristics of males and females."'2 Manhart,
however, did not involve a fictional difference, rather a true gen-
eralization that women as a class live longer than men.' The
issue was whether Title VII allowed disparate treatment for men
and women based upon statistical differences between the classes."
Justice Stevens began his analysis by noting that it is true that
not all individuals in a class share the characteristics of that
class,1 ' therefore what is fair treatment for the class may none-
theless be unfair for the individual. The Court held that Title VII's
focus on the individual is unambiguous:" the statute makes it un-
lawful to discriminate against any "individual.. . because of such
individual's... sex .... ."" This precludes treatment of individuals
as simply components of a sexual class.28 While the employer
argued that to require equal pay contributions from males and
females would be unfair to its class of male employees, the Court
held that the question of fairness to various classes affected by
the statute is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature,"
and Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like
those based on national origin or race, are unlawful." In dissent,
Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined, argued
that it is only rational to permit employers to rely on statistically
... Id. at 707.
128 Id. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert.
granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 737 (1976);
Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974); Sprogis v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
129 435 U.S. at 707.
30 Id. See Developments, supra note 6.
1 435 U.S. at 707-08.
132 Id.
1242 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976) (emphasis added).
435 U.S. at 708.
I ld. at 709.
13' Id.
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sound and proven disparities in longevity between men and
women. ' They believe it to be irrational to assume that Con-
gress intended to outlaw the use of such facts.'
While the Court never addressed the subject of flight attendant
weight regulations, it seems its decision in Manhart could have a
profound effect upon what appeared to be settled law. Its language
speaks directly to the issues that are involved in the weight regu-
lation cases, namely may an employer prescribe different require-
ments for male and female employees, even when the requirements
are based upon valid statistical differences? The majority opinion
in Manhart answers the question in the negative.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until Manhart, it appeared that the legality of flight attendant
weight requirements, which imposed different standards for males
than for females, was settled under Title VII. The airline com-
panies were unable to justify their weight requirements under
Title VII's BFOQ exception because they could not show a valid
occupational reason why their female flight attendants had to
weigh less than their male counterparts."" Customer preferences
are not sufficient under the statute," and any assumed correlation
between weight and physical condition is too tenuous under
Dothard v. Rawlinson.4 ' Therefore, if plaintiffs could prove the
industry weight standards discriminated on the basis of sex, such
standards would be struck down under Title VII.
Plaintiffs who attempted to prove sex discrimination by show-
ing that flight attendant weight requirements had a disproportion-
ate statistical impact upon the ability of the general public to
comply were unsuccessful.'" While in most cases a smaller per-
centage of American women than American men were able to
meet the flight attendant weight requirements, the courts held these
statistical differences were not large enough to establish a dis-
I7 d. at 726.
"i nd.
139 See notes 25-33 supra, and accompanying text.
14 See notes 25-26 supra, and accompanying text.
14
1 See notes 29-33 supra, and accompanying text.
14 See notes 44-52 supra, and accompanying text.
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criminatory impact upon women.1
In other cases, however, it was argued that the flight attendant
weight requirements were illegal because Title VII prohibited any
class-based disparate treatment, where the classification was based
on sex.'" Courts faced with this argument looked for precedent
to the cosmetic "grooming code cases" where the same argument
was made.' Because the grooming code cases were in conflict,
plaintiffs often successfully argued that the weight requirements
were illegal because Title VII prohibited any difference in treat-
ment between the sexes.'" In Willingham the Fifth Circuit re-
solved the conflict in the grooming code cases by holding that
Title VII does not prohibit employers from distinguishing between
men and women unless the distinction is based upon an "immut-
able characteristic" or a "fundamental right." Since Willingham,
courts have consistently upheld employer grooming regulations.1
Since Willingham, plaintiffs challenging flight attendant weight
requirements have also been unsuccessful. 9 In the weight require-
ment cases, the courts have followed the Willingham analysis and
upheld the requirements because a person's weight is neither
"immutable" nor a "fundamental right.""' The legality of dis-
parate weight requirements thus seemed settled, because the courts
refused to hold that Title VII prohibited any difference in treat-
ment between the sexes, and plaintiffs were unable to show a
sufficiently disproportionate statistical impact.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Manhart casts doubt upon the
continuing validity of the Willingham analysis in both the groom-
ing code and weight regulation cases. While men do weigh more
than women, any weight control programs which rely upon class-
based statistics are violative of Title VII's "individual" focus. It
is now irrelevant that plaintiffs cannot prove the weight require-
ments have a disproportionate statistical impact because, under
14
3 nd.
14 See note 59 supra.
14' See note 60 supra.
1 See note 59 supra.
14 See notes 75-86 supra, and accompanying text.
141 See notes 88-92 supra, and accompanying text.
14 See notes 100-121 supra, and accompanying text.
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Manhart, Title VII precludes any sex-based difference in treat-
ment, even when based on a valid statistical difference.
A flight attendant's weight maximum should be determined by
his or her individual characteristics, including bone structure and
frame size. Individually determined weight maximums will insure
healthy, physically fit flight attendants even better than class-based
statistics, and will not conflict with Manhart.

